The question of whether things could be different dogs academic and political leaders. NATO was seen as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, but after the collapse of the superpower, the position of the most capitalist Russia in Europe and the world was not always clear. In 2000, the new Russian president told the BBC’s David Frost that he saw no problem with Russia’s accession, and in 2001 he later claimed that he had even asked his US counterpart Bill Clinton directly for the election, at a cold reception. The West has taken a different path, extending from the former Eastern bloc Poland in 1999 to the former Soviet republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 2004 – with Russia left abroad. Was it the right idea? A recent Foreign Affairs survey asked 61 experts in the field if they agreed with the statement: “Continuing NATO enlargement after the end of the Cold War was a strategic mistake.” Their contributions have been fascinating, ranging from ominous counter-events – including a re-militarized Germany to a less secure Europe where NATO has never filled the gap – to the regret that Russia has given less of a collective concern. “NATO expansion” created conditions under which it was more likely that the government in Moscow would take a rather aggressive, defensive stance, “said Alex Pravda of the Oxford School of Global and Regional Studies. A new, integrated European security agency with Russia as co-founder was a possible alternative, he told i. After the Cold War, some efforts were made in this direction. A NATO-Russia Council was set up, but that was outside the alliance itself, and according to Dr. Pravda, there was always a “fundamental feeling” that Russia was not the co-founder who thought it was worthy.
Back to the Cold War
Russia has not always been hostile to NATO. But after the West’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, Moscow was left to feel that NATO was ultimately “the shooter” in a way that conflicted with its view of itself as a key player and guarantor in Europe. Relations deteriorated further at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, when Georgia and Ukraine, key components of the old USSR, were informed that they could eventually become members. The Kremlin saw the overthrow of pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014 as “encouraging the West to change Maidan”, all part of a journey that saw Russia’s sphere of influence diminish and the West intervene. The Maidan uprising was a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine, which began on November 21, 2013 with large demonstrations in Maidan Nezaleznosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv. The goal of the West, “as soon as Putin, with his delusional fantasies, leaves the scene,” should be to reshape Russia’s perception of its intentions, said Johns Hopkins’s Sergei Radchenko. “Leaders must recognize that Russia’s thinking about the West is largely shaped by the perception, right or wrong, that the West is seeking to dismantle Russia,” he said. Georgetown’s Charles Kupchan said in the inquiry: “NATO expansion should have taken place only if and when Russia revealed an offensive intention.”
More than the world
The other path
But the approach taken by the West has had its benefits. NATO expansion was “the key to preventing the worst-case scenarios” after the Cold War, such as a nuclear Eastern Europe or militarized Germany, said Paul Poast of the University of Chicago. Professor Poast said it was not necessarily “the best option”, with an alternative security structure with Russia as a stakeholder might be a “better result”. Professor Poast said the argument that NATO may have made matters worse was a “fair criticism”, but noted that many scholars since the early 1990s have identified Ukraine and Russia as “the main point of contention”. “There has always been this recognition that these two countries could be involved in a conflict, when you put it this way it kind of makes you say, ‘Is there anything someone could have done?’ He said things were really falling apart when NATO “went a long way” in the Baltic states. “This will be perceived as categorically different as the other [central European] countries that were part of as they were part of the Soviet Union “. Andrei Kolesnikov of the Carnegie Moscow Center told the Foreign Affairs website that he believed that NATO enlargement “never threatened Russia”, while that countries in Eastern Europe “have acquired a European anchor”. “Another thing is that it has ignited nationalist sentiment in Russia,” he said. “And when Putin came to power, he became a factor in his hostility to the West, which culminated in a ‘special operation.’ Johns Hopkins University’s Francis Jay Gavin said a “dangerous power vacuum” could have arisen in central Europe if NATO had not expanded. “There is no guarantee that Russia would be happy with European security arrangements other than the return of its former empire and its spheres of influence,” Gavin told the inquiry.
The very overextension of Russia
Ironically, Russia’s land, air and sea invasion of its former Soviet neighbor seems to have pushed previously neutral countries, such as Finland and Sweden, closer to the idea of joining the 30-man military alliance.
Georgia remains interested in advancing its candidacy, and Ukraine, although it may need to keep NATO membership on the table for any peace deal, has been moved closer to Europe by the events, rather than being pushed back into the Russian fold. .
The invasion “made NATO more unified than ever,” said Professor Post, with implications for Western institutions beyond NATO.
“It has now made the European Union see itself as a potential provider of security,” he said.
“The fact that the EU has provided military assistance is something that is not being done, but it is essential for something like the EU to become a stronger, state-owned entity.”
