The irony is that, with the world plunged into a battle of civilizations between free and unfree societies, the supremacy of freedom over tyranny has never been more intense. Russia’s catastrophic invasion of Ukraine is an example of a book about how authoritarian top-down systems can collapse in the face of resistance. Ukrainians have proven agile, adapting quickly to challenges and effectively developing game-changing technologies such as drones. The Russian military, on the other hand, has been slow to realize what is perhaps the greatest emerging lesson of this war: that large, inconceivable equipment such as tanks and helicopters no longer provide the benefits they once had. If nothing else, Vladimir Putin has doubled his central control. The catastrophic number of high-ranking Russian casualties is proof of the need for its generals to be placed closer and closer to the front line. Indeed, Russia’s humiliation of Ukraine shows how vulnerable authoritarian systems are to the epic mistakes of their elites. Surrounded by slanderers, Putin blatantly underestimated Ukraine’s determination and overestimated the capabilities of the Russian military. We also see how authoritarian regimes – which build their legitimacy on the illusion of impeccable crisis – have dangerously little room for maneuver to correct major mistakes. Having plunged Russia into an unbeatable conflict, Putin can not withdraw or even secure limited gains through a peace settlement, as this would call into question his decision to start the war with such maximalist goals from the beginning. The Kremlin’s inability to show weakness has exhausted Russia not only in the heat of battle, but steadily over time. The Russian army failed to undertake radical reform after the end of the Cold War. Nor has it dealt with its problems with corruption. As a result, fuel embezzlement and equipment shortages have jeopardized its combat performance. Possible technological innovations, which could have tipped the scales in Russia’s favor, simply failed to emerge. But what about China? Beijing seems to have overcome many of the shortcomings inherent in authoritarian regimes. Unlike Russia, it has proven to be more than capable of humble self-reflection. Aware of its military inferiority, it has worked to close the gap between conventional forces and the United States and offset Washington’s most powerful strengths – for example, by dealing with the air force and navy with supersonic. The Chinese Communist Party has also proved capable of radical changes of direction. In the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, it played the role of opening up China to the forces of the free market. It lifted millions out of poverty as a result, while preventing movements for political freedom. Today, it is ruthlessly seeking to reinvent China in the face of adversity once again. Terrified of falling into the middle-income trap and unable to build a domestic consumer market, she puts technological innovation at the center of her plans for economic growth – blueprints that shame the half-baked technological strategies of the West. And yet Beijing is beginning to show the same fundamental weaknesses as Russia. The CCP’s destructive policy towards Zero Covid betrays its vulnerability to monumental crisis mistakes. As the rest of the world returns to normal, Shanghai has become a stronghold of exclusion, fomenting unrest and causing financial chaos. Moreover, despite the fact that politics is clearly a disaster, the CCP can not change course, lest it lose its face. The party has not escaped the need of all totalitarian regimes to show strength in the face of weakness. Zero Covid’s pursuit has allowed the CCP to simulate unlimited state power, even over an invisible virus, while diverting attention from its struggles to create effective vaccines. Of course, this political theater has actually weakened China, trapping it in a catastrophic cycle that forces it to close every time the number of Covid cases increases. Both Beijing and Moscow demonstrate another key weakness of authoritarian states: the elites that preside over them will always put their own power above the interests of the people they rule. This is becoming apparent in connection with the invasion of Ukraine. It is certainly in Russia’s interest to reduce its losses. Only with the end of the war and Western sanctions can Moscow hope to review its military and review its long-term strategic game. Putin and his friends will not put their country first, however, because it would threaten their position internally. As it stands, his country is now facing a painful and prolonged defeat on the battlefield, and perhaps even the loss of its position as a great power. Likewise, the CCP is beginning to discreetly change its grand deal with its people. Since the 1990s, Chinese citizens have embraced totalitarianism on the condition that it offer jobs and prosperity. But more and more the country’s leaders are trying to support their power by controlling the people instead of offering development. Legal experts warn that Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaigns allow officials to imprison businessmen they believe have become too independent of the state. The CCP has also recently banned an entire sector of the economy, private tuition, for fear that the financial burden will prevent families from having more children. Time will tell if the Chinese people will finally feel that their social contract with the state is in danger and will revolt. Of course, the western model is not perfect. Our armies must be more open to change if we are to dominate modern warfare. Our policy is very short-term. Unlike the Thatcher and Reagan years, our leaders do not have a clear sense that freedom must be defended both as a strategic asset and as a moral good. However, it is clear from the suffering of China and Russia that free societies retain the advantage. This should give us confidence for the difficult times to come.
